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675 
Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights 
and Liberties 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.* 
Many law professors and commentators condemned the Bush 
Administration’s “War on Terrorism” as involving unprecedented 
assertions of Article II power that sacrificed constitutional rights 
and liberties for no purpose, as America actually became less 
safe.1  This Symposium provides a valuable opportunity to test 
such claims against history, with a special focus on Abraham 
Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War.  This historical 
perspective casts doubt upon the conventional wisdom that the 
War on Terrorism has caused unique harm to the Constitution’s 
structure and the individual rights it guarantees. 
More specifically, our panel has been asked to address three 
questions concerning the Constitution’s delicate balance between 
protecting national security and preserving fundamental rights.  
First, are wartime limitations on civil liberties necessary to avoid 
military defeat?  Second, do such restrictions influence the 
subsequent creation and enhancement of civil rights?  Third, if 
these later legal gains occur, do they ultimately justify the 
wartime measures?  I am afraid that I cannot answer any of 
these questions with much confidence. 
Initially, it is impossible to say with any certainty whether 
or not Presidents like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt 
had to infringe constitutional liberties the way they did in order 
to win their wars.2  Perhaps they could have achieved the same 
results with fewer intrusions.  But maybe greater solicitude for 
personal freedoms would have led to defeat, or to a victory that 
exacted a far greater cost in blood and money.  Speculating about 
such matters is an academic exercise.  All we know for sure is 
that these Presidents took the actions they deemed necessary to 
 
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law.  J.D., 
Yale, 1988. 
 1 See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA 
IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy 
Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1006–07 (2007) [hereinafter Pushaw, Enemy Combatant] 
(citing other prominent critics such as Bruce Ackerman, Neal Katyal, and Harold Koh). 
 2 See infra Parts I.B & C (summarizing the actions of Lincoln and Roosevelt). 
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prevail, and they did.3  For better or worse, the Constitution 
commits to the President almost unbridled discretion to 
determine what must be done to meet a military emergency.4  
These decisions must be made quickly and with imperfect 
information, and they are then judged by Congress, voters, and 
posterity.  All of these groups tend to be quite forgiving of the 
President if he triumphs. 
Turning to the second issue, the orthodox view is that 
Americans, out of some blend of fear and patriotism, blindly 
support Presidents during military crises when they trample civil 
liberties,5 but later feel remorseful, vow that such excesses will 
never happen again, and bestow civil rights generously.6  I do not 
believe we can isolate a collective sense of guilt over wartime sins 
and attempted redemption as the single “cause” of civil rights 
laws, which reflect multiple political, legal, social, ideological, 
economic, moral, and religious factors.7 
Finally, even if there were such a direct causal connection, 
determining whether wartime curtailments of civil liberties are 
justified by subsequent efforts to secure civil rights requires an 
entirely subjective judgment.8  Most obviously, the immediate 
victims of government heavy-handedness, such as those denied 
habeas corpus during the Civil War or Japanese Americans 
interned during World War II, would find cold comfort in the 
later extension of civil rights (particularly to some other group).  
On the other hand, African Americans would conclude that (1) 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were 
well worth the price of Lincoln’s impairments of individual 
liberties, and (2) the Civil and Voting Rights Acts expiated any of 
FDR’s excesses during World War II.  Instead of trying to figure 
out whether later gains excuse wartime pains, I prefer to 
concentrate on the dispositive issue: whether the limits on 
constitutional rights were necessary to achieve the greater good 
of winning the war.  A President can never rationalize a 
gratuitous abridgment of personal liberties based on the mere 
possibility of future improvements in civil rights. 
 
 3 See infra Parts I.B & C. 
 4 See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing executive war powers). 
 5 See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004); 
Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 903 (2004). 
 6 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal 
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 262 (2002); but 
see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
605, 610, 622–25, 643–44 (2003) (describing the idea of a “libertarian ratchet”—that wars 
have produced ever-increasing respect for civil rights and liberties—but dismissing it as 
empirically unfounded). 
 7 See infra Part II. 
 8 The arguments in this paragraph will be developed infra Part III. 
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The foregoing analysis, which incorporates the lessons of 
history, has several implications for the War on Terrorism.9  
Most importantly, although President Bush asserted aggressive 
unilateral executive powers, his response to al Qaeda’s 
September 11, 2001 attacks was fairly mild in comparison with 
the actions of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and other Presidents.10  
Furthermore, like his predecessors, Bush can defend his 
infringements on civil liberties as necessary to achieve his 
avowed objective: preventing another terrorist assault.11  In the 
past, such success has usually been sufficient for a President to 
deflect charges that he went overboard. 
Indeed, the majority of Americans have always solidly 
supported antiterrorism efforts.12  Although the legal and media 
intelligentsia have been outraged by conditions at Guantanamo 
Bay, average people do not appear to feel widespread regret that 
will result in a compensatory increase in civil rights.13  Rather, 
any such expansion would be primarily attributable to the 
election of Barack Obama, who ardently supports this cause. 
In this Essay, I will devote most of my analysis to the 
threshold issue of whether wartime restrictions on civil liberties 
are necessary to avoid a military loss.  I will then explore 
whether such constraints eventually result in an overall 
enlargement of civil rights.  Finally, I will consider whether those 
improvements excuse the infringement of rights during the 
military crisis. 
I.  LIMITING CIVIL LIBERTIES TO HELP WIN WARS 
Professors have typically argued that Presidents like 
Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, and Bush have lost their 
heads in the heat of war and curbed civil liberties to a far greater 
extent than was needed to ensure victory.14  They might be right.  
But they might be wrong.  For example, perhaps if Lincoln had 
been more sensitive to individual constitutional rights, he would 
have lost the Civil War and the United States would have 
fractured along North-South lines, and then probably further 
fragmented into regional nations (or possibly autonomous states).  
It is intellectually interesting, but pointless, to try to ascertain 
what might have happened if Presidents had taken different 
 
 9 See infra Part I.D. 
 10 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra Part I.D. 
 12 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 608–10, 612–22 (summarizing and 
criticizing this prevalent view). 
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courses of action.  Put simply, it is impossible to test the 
libertarian academics’ arguments empirically. 
More significantly, these critics tend to make two 
fundamental errors.  First, they incorrectly assume that the 
Constitution supplies fixed legal rules for determining when the 
President went “too far” in exercising war powers and clearly 
violated individual rights.15  Second, they judge federal 
government officials based on hindsight, rather than on the facts 
and circumstances that existed at the time those leaders had to 
make decisions.16 
A study of the Constitution as written and as actually 
implemented in wars reveals that the political branches have 
enormous leeway in exercising military powers to respond to the 
unique conditions of each armed conflict.  Given the complexities 
of decision-making during a military crisis, it is usually quite 
difficult to conclude definitively that Congress or the President 
abused their discretion. 
A. The Constitutional Design 
The Constitution entrusts the power to make, execute, and 
evaluate military and foreign policy exclusively to the political 
departments, which have the democratic legitimacy, institutional 
competence, and political incentives to defend the nation.17  In 
supporting this conferral of plenary authority, Alexander 
Hamilton declared: 
[War] powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it is 
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national 
exigencies, or the correspondent extent & variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them.  The circumstances that endanger 
the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is 
committed.  This power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible 
combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the 
direction of the same councils, which are appointed to preside over the 
common defence [sic].18 
Specifically, Article I authorizes Congress to provide for the 
 
 15 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1005–47 (demonstrating that the 
Constitution does not set forth such clear legal principles and that, consequently, the 
Court has always struggled in attempting to identify limits on executive military 
authority). 
 16 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 608–10, 620, 623–26. 
 17 For an extensive analysis of the relevant textual and historical sources, see 
Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1017–23. 
 18 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (original emphasis omitted, new emphasis added); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, 
at 270 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (to similar effect). 
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national defense;19 declare war or otherwise approve it;20 create, 
finance, and regulate the armed forces;21 and suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus “when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”22  Article II confers 
on the President federal “executive power”23 and enables him to 
direct the army and navy as “Commander in Chief.”24  
Furthermore, the structure of Article II suggests that the 
President can unilaterally address emergencies because only he, 
as the sole repository of all executive power and the lone federal 
official always on duty, can act swiftly and resolutely based on 
the recommendations of experts who have access to secret 
military intelligence.25  By contrast, the other two departments 
labor in fixed sessions: Congress legislates through a time-
consuming process of debate and compromise, while federal 
courts render judgments only after parties have properly invoked 
their jurisdiction and lengthy litigation has been completed.26 
In short, the Constitution grants Congress and the President 
all conceivable war powers, and gives each branch weapons to 
check the other.27  For instance, Congress can investigate the 
executive branch’s conduct of war,28 halt any armed conflict by 
cutting off funding,29 and impeach executive officials for 
 
 19 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 21 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16.  
 22 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  This clause does not explicitly state that only 
“Congress” can suspend the writ.  Nonetheless, this conclusion seems obvious because of 
the provision’s location in Article I (which governs Congress alone) and longstanding 
English and American practice confiding this drastic power to multi-member legislatures.  
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 91–92, 101 (1807). 
 23 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 24 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 25 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 471–73, 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 132-33 (2005). 
 26 For exhaustive consideration of how the Constitution’s separation-of-powers 
framework nicely accounted for these institutional differences, see AMAR, supra note 25, 
at 131–204, 351–63; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A 
Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 400–35 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, 
Justiciability]; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and 
the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001) (examining the meaning of Article 
III “judicial power” and the inherent authority of federal judges in light of constitutional 
history, theory, and structure). 
 27 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 173–77 (1996) (making this point and 
contending that the Constitution does not create any particular process for initiating war, 
but rather allows the political branches to work out these details). 
 28 Article I’s broad grant of “legislative power” has always been understood to 
include oversight of all executive branch actions.  See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 
26, at 404–05. 
 29 See Yoo, supra note 27, at 174, 196–97, 218, 241–90, 295–96, 300, 305 (discussing 
the power of the purse and impeachment as the key legislative checks). 
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egregious misconduct.30  Conversely, the President can veto 
legislation31 that he believes hampers the military and can 
exploit the institutional advantages of the unitary executive to 
maintain a singular focus that often overwhelms the multi-
member Congress, especially when it is sharply divided along 
party lines. 
Not surprisingly, Article III gives the judiciary no role in 
warfare.32  Thus, claims that a military action violated Articles I 
or II are political, not judicial, questions.33  The only time judicial 
review might be proper would be when the exercise of war 
powers allegedly violated individual legal rights.  Unfortunately, 
the historical record is silent as to whether such cases should be 
dismissed as nonjusticiable, treated the same as decisions made 
in ordinary contexts, or addressed through a compromise 
approach of asserting jurisdiction but demonstrating 
extraordinary deference to the political branches.  The Court 
adopted the latter position, which seems to be the best way to 
balance the Constitution’s institution of judicial review with its 
provisions entrusting national security primarily to Congress and 
the President.34 
In implementing the Constitution, all three branches have 
determined that sometimes individual rights and liberties must 
yield to the national imperative of winning a war.  The primary 
actor has been the President, who has had to make swift 
decisions based on a constantly shifting military situation and 
 
 30 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (providing for impeachment by the House of 
Representatives); id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (authorizing the Senate to conduct impeachment 
trials). 
 31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 32 Recognizing this point, the Justices in 1793 declined President Washington’s 
request for legal advice on questions related to military and foreign affairs, and they 
instead suggested that he seek such counsel from his Cabinet officers.  See Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory 
Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473 (1998) (describing this incident and 
explaining how it became the foundation of the judiciary’s practice of refusing to give legal 
advice). 
 33 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 524–25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961).  The Court has always confirmed this principle.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–71 (1803); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28–33 (1827); 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–45 (1849); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 243, 251–54 (1863); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 71–77 (1867); Johnson 
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770, 774–87 (1950); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–12 
(1973).  For an attempt to clarify the political question doctrine by placing it on a firm 
historical footing, see generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political 
Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1165 (2002). 
 34 Scholars of divergent political stripes have endorsed the Court’s approach of 
exercising judicial review to safeguard individual rights but showing great respect for the 
military judgments of the political departments.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 27, at 182–86; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 66. 
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imperfect intelligence.35  As long as they acted reasonably under 
the circumstances, strong Presidents who have forcefully and 
successfully responded to military crises have always enjoyed the 
support of Congress, the courts, and the American people.  Thus, 
modern laments that these Presidents have gone “too far” often 
smack of Monday-morning quarterbacking.  The examples of 
Lincoln and Roosevelt are especially illuminating. 
B. Lincoln’s Constitutionalism 
Depending on your ideology, Abraham Lincoln is either the 
patron saint–or sinner–of muscular executive leadership during 
war.  When Fort Sumter was attacked on April 12, 1861, 
Congress was not in session.36  Lincoln determined that waiting 
for Congress to reassemble would create intolerable military 
problems, and so he immediately took decisive and 
unprecedented actions.37 
For example, the President increased the size of the military, 
called for volunteers, and appropriated huge sums of money for 
the war effort despite the Constitution’s grant of such powers to 
Congress.38  With similar gumption, he blockaded Confederate 
ports and ordered the seizure of all ships in the forbidden zone 
even though doing so raised serious Fifth Amendment problems 
of taking property without due process.39  Likewise, Lincoln 
banned disloyal speech and press in seeming disregard of the 
First Amendment, and he created military tribunals that did not 
provide ordinary due process protections.40 
Perhaps most famously, Lincoln suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus and jailed thousands of civilians without affording 
them any judicial process.41  Initially, Lincoln’s main fear was 
that Maryland would secede, which would hinder and perhaps 
destroy the war effort by cutting off Washington from the rest of 
the Union.42  Accordingly, Lincoln ordered the Army to place 
Confederate sympathizers in Maryland in military prisons.43  
Merryman, one such detainee, filed a habeas petition to the 
 
 35 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 36 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 132–33, 354–55 (stressing this fact as a key 
justification for Lincoln’s unilateral assertion of Article II powers until Congress could 
reconvene). 
 37 See id. at 122. 
 38 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 17–18, 117–18, 136–38, 192, 196–
97 (2003). 
 39 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–71 (1862) (upholding Lincoln’s 
actions as a valid exercise of his Article II power as Commander-in-Chief). 
 40 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 8, 17, 19–20, 118, 144–45, 163–75. 
 41 See id. at 16–17, 19, 117, 144, 157–63, 192–95. 
 42 See id. at 16, 18, 117, 157–63, 192–95; AMAR, supra note 25, at 122, 355. 
 43 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 17–20, 157–163. 
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Circuit Court manned by Chief Justice Taney.44  He ordered the 
release of Merryman after concluding that Lincoln had broken 
his oath to faithfully execute the law by usurping (1) Congress’s 
Article I power to suspend habeas corpus, and (2) the judiciary’s 
Article III function of deciding whether citizens had been 
unconstitutionally detained.45 
Lincoln refused to comply.  Soon thereafter, when Congress 
had reassembled, Lincoln justified his conduct in a special 
address.46  He contended that the President’s oath to “preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution” as a whole justified taking 
any actions he deemed necessary to save the Union, even those 
that temporarily disregarded individual constitutional 
provisions.47  In Lincoln’s own words: “[M]easures, otherwise 
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming 
indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through 
the preservation of the nation.”48  As for habeas specifically, 
Lincoln rhetorically asked: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go 
unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one 
be violated?”49 
Yet Lincoln was not the tyrant that some have made him out 
to be.50  On the contrary, he had a profound reverence for 
constitutional democracy.51  Accordingly, Lincoln recognized that 
he needed the approval of Congress, especially because it was the 
only branch that could constitutionally continue to fund the 
war.52  Congress ratified Lincoln’s actions (including his 
suspension of habeas) and supported him for the remainder of 
the war.53 
 
 44 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). 
 45 See id. at 147–53; RONALD C. WHITE, JR., A. LINCOLN: A BIOGRAPHY 416–17 (2009). 
 46 See 6 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297 (John A. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1905). 
 47 Id. at 309. 
 48 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 691, 721 (2004) (book review) (quoting Lincoln and defending his theory of 
the Constitution during wartime). 
 49 Id. at 723. 
 50 See WHITE, supra note 45, at 3–6, 417, 443, 519, 553–57, 563–69, 584 
(acknowledging the charge that Lincoln acted like a dictator, but demonstrating its 
falsity). 
 51 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 21, 38–39, 51–52, 118–19, 132, 146–47, 188, 196, 275, 
368–73, 471–472.  Most tellingly, Lincoln always insisted that the Presidential elections 
would be held in 1864 based on the timetable set forth in the Constitution, even when the 
North was faring badly and there was a very real possibility he would lose.  Id. at 146–47. 
 52 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 18, 24, 118, 137–48, 192–97. 
 53 See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326 (approving Lincoln’s earlier 
actions); Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (authorizing suspension of writ of 
habeas corpus); see also AMAR, supra note 25, at 132–33 (emphasizing that Lincoln 
sought, and received, Congress’s blessing during the Civil War).  For a detailed discussion 
of Lincoln’s respect for Congress’s role in warmaking, see David J. Barron & Martin S. 
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A chastened Court also fell into line.  In The Prize Cases,54 a 
majority of Justices upheld the validity of Lincoln’s blockade 
against a challenge by owners of seized vessels who claimed that 
their property had been taken without due process.55  The Court 
concluded that it could not review the President’s exercise of 
political discretion, which Article II confided in him as 
Commander-in-Chief, to “determine what degree of force the 
crisis demands” (such as the blockade).56 
Likewise, Ex parte Vallandigham57 rejected a due process 
challenge to an Army tribunal created under Lincoln’s orders.58  
The Court disavowed any power to “review or pronounce any 
opinion upon the proceedings of a military commission”59 or 
similar executive wartime decisions.60 
Finally, Lincoln fulfilled his preelection promise to decline to 
adhere to the Court’s constitutional holding in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford61 that the federal government could not intrude upon 
state power over slavery.62  Invoking his authority as 
Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln emancipated millions of slaves in 
rebellious Southern areas, even though such a hugely 
consequential policy determination seemed to fall squarely 
within the legislative domain.63 
The Civil War teaches that a strong President can sweep 
aside significant constitutional provisions—including both 
clauses that confer powers on Congress or the courts and those 
that protect individual rights and liberties—if he determines that 
this course must be taken to address a military emergency.64  
Modern libertarians who assert that Lincoln went “too far” 
cannot easily explain the contemporaneous consensus that he did 
not.  The President himself, among the most profound 
 
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb–A Constitutional History, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 941, 993–1021 (2008). 
 54 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 55 Id. at 665–82. 
 56 Id. at 670. 
 57 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). 
 58 Id. at 243, 248. 
 59 Id. at 252. 
 60 Id. at 254 (referring to Martin v. Mott and Dynes v. Hoover). 
 61 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 62 Id. at 446–52.  See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the 
Land, and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1987) 
(describing Lincoln’s view that Congress and the President, in carrying out their duties 
under Articles I and II, could rely on their independent interpretation of the Constitution 
and therefore did not have to conform their actions to the Court’s Dred Scott decision). 
 63 See FARBER, supra note 38, at 19, 21, 144–45, 152–57; AMAR, supra note 25, at 
281, 356–58, 373, 380. 
 64 See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 25 
(1976). 
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constitutional thinkers America has ever produced, did not 
consider his actions excessive under the circumstances.65  
Neither did Congress, which approved his conduct.66  Neither did 
the Court as an institution (as distinguished from individual 
Justices like Taney), which concluded either that the 
Constitution left wartime decisions entirely to the President’s 
discretion or upheld them on the merits.67  Last, but not least, 
posterity has lionized Lincoln, who is equaled only by George 
Washington in the presidential pantheon. 
Modern Presidents absorbed the lesson of the Civil War.  For 
example, Woodrow Wilson had no qualms about sacrificing 
individual liberties if doing so, in his judgment, would help 
achieve victory in World War I.68  Indeed, even after the war had 
ended, Wilson continued to suppress freedom of expression.69  
Wilson, however, was merely a warmup for Roosevelt, who 
emulated Lincoln in the sheer audacity and scope of his 
assertions of war powers. 
C. Roosevelt: Lincoln Redux 
Even before Congress declared war in December 1941, 
Roosevelt had independently engaged in negotiations over 
military and foreign affairs with Great Britain, sent troops to the 
North Atlantic, ordered Nazi U-boats shot on sight, and declared 
a state of “unlimited national emergency.”70  After America 
entered World War II, Roosevelt did whatever he deemed 
necessary to win it, which included suppressing constitutional 
liberties.71 
Roosevelt followed Lincoln in two specific ways.  First, FDR 
successfully seized private property, including over sixty plants 
where labor disputes and other problems had impeded the war 
effort.72  Second, he created military commissions to try enemies 
charged with war crimes.73  In Ex parte Quirin,74 the Court 
 
 65 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 132. 
 66 Id. at 132–33. 
 67 See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
 68 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1034–35 (citing numerous 
instances and sources). 
 69 See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR 
POWERS SINCE 1918, at 1–2, 13–16, 191–253 (1989). 
 70 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 110–13 (1973). 
 71 Id. 
 72 The Court waited until the end of hostilities to consider legal challenges to these 
seizures, then dismissed the cases as moot.  See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 690 (1945); see also ROSSITER, supra note 64, at 59–63 (describing such 
commandeering and the Court’s timid response). 
 73 In Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Court interpreted an unclear federal 
statute as empowering the President to establish such tribunals, thereby avoiding having 
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sustained a commission’s imposition of the death penalty against 
Nazi spies (including an American citizen) who had stealthily 
entered the United States, and rejected their claim that the 
Constitution guaranteed their right to a trial in civilian court 
with ordinary procedural protections.75  Roosevelt had used 
intermediaries to inform the Justices that he intended to execute 
the saboteurs whatever the Court decided, and he had marshaled 
massive popular support in this matter.76 
FDR’s most novel, and notorious, decision was his executive 
order (issued on the advice of his generals, and reinforced by an 
Act of Congress) removing Americans of Japanese descent from 
the West Coast to prison camps to prevent espionage and 
sabotage on behalf of Japan.77  Even though it eventually became 
apparent that there was no credible evidence of such disloyal 
activities, the Court in Korematsu concluded that it could not use 
hindsight to condemn the actions taken in the emergency that 
followed Pearl Harbor.78  Therefore, the Court held that military 
necessity justified the severe infringement of the detainees’ 
rights to liberty and equality.79 
In his dissent, Justice Jackson sagely noted that the “chief 
restraint” on the President and his military subordinates was 
“their responsibility to the political judgments of their 
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.”80  
Roosevelt’s “contemporaries” obviously approved his conduct.  He 
was the only President elected more than twice, and his 
convincing reelection to a fourth term in 1944 indicated broad 
popular support for his handling of World War II.81  Congress 
also backed FDR’s military decisions.  Similarly, the Court 
 
to reach Roosevelt’s claim that he had power to do so independently under Article II.  See 
id. at 21–30, 38–39, 45–48; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1036 
n.136 and accompanying text (disputing the Court’s statutory construction). 
 74 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 75 Id. at 22–48. 
 76 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 
309, 319–32; Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying 
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1291 (2002). 
 77 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–17 (1944) (setting forth these 
laws and their stated rationales). 
 78 See id. at 218–19, 223–24. 
 79 See id. at 215–24. 
 80 Id. at 248.  He further argued that the case should have been dismissed because 
he and his colleagues lacked adequate information to meaningfully review the President’s 
assertion of military necessity but that the Court, having taken jurisdiction, should have 
struck down the exclusion order because it plainly violated the constitutional rights of 
Japanese Americans.  See id. at 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 81 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1039 & n.149. 
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rejected every constitutional challenge to his exercise of war 
powers.82 
The “moral judgments of history” are mixed.  On the one 
hand, Roosevelt is considered the greatest twentieth-century 
President, in large part because he led America to victory in a 
war that mortally threatened not only the United States but all 
democracies.  On the other hand, FDR’s internment of Japanese 
Americans is a stain on his legacy, an overreaction to Pearl 
Harbor that reflected racism more than military exigencies.83 
The overall picture, however, is best captured by America’s 
decision to build a monument honoring Roosevelt, as it did for 
Lincoln.84  These marble symbols send the clear message that, in 
a high-stakes war, Presidents should err on the side of using too 
much force (including intrusions on constitutional liberties) to 
win, rather than risk defeat by showing greater sensitivity for 
individual rights. 
D. Bush and the War on Terrorism 
Since September 11, 2001, America has been engaged in a 
unique conflict.  Unlike past wars, America is not fighting a 
nation-state for a finite time period in a series of battles.  Rather, 
we are confronting shadowy worldwide private terrorist groups 
like al Qaeda, which strike indiscriminately in a struggle that 
will probably never end.  Accordingly, the Bush Administration 
responded with equally innovative strategies and tactics.  The 
War on Terrorism raises difficult constitutional questions 
concerning how to strike the optimum balance between national 
defense and individual rights. 
Most legal academics and commentators, however, see the 
issues as straightforward.  They have accused President Bush of 
unparalleled misconduct.85  Indeed, many professors—including 
one on this panel—have argued that he and many of his military 
and legal officials should be prosecuted for war crimes.86  I find 
 
 82 See supra notes 74–82 and accompanying text (describing cases like Quirin and 
Korematsu). 
 83 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 13 (Oxford University Press 1983). 
 84 Doug Struck, Clinton Dedicates Memorial, Urges Americans to Emulate FDR, 
WASH. POST., May 3, 1997, at A01. 
 85 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Marjorie Cohn, Trading Civil Liberties for Apparent Security is a Bad Deal, 12 
CHAP. L. REV. 615, 638 (2009).  The Obama Administration initially indicated that it 
would not pursue this course of action.  See Editorial, Prosecuting the CIA, WALL STREET 
J., Aug. 25, 2009, at A14.  In late August, however, Attorney General Eric Holder 
announced the appointment of a special counsel to investigate whether CIA officials 
violated federal law in interrogating suspected terrorists.  Id.  Those officials will 
undoubtedly argue that they acted under the orders of their superiors, who in turn relied 
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such rhetoric overheated, particularly when one compares Bush’s 
specific policies to those adopted in previous wars. 
1.  The Main Features of the Antiterrorism Effort 
In this Essay, I can merely provide an outline of the relevant 
law.  This summary will focus on the two key statutes passed by 
overwhelming margins shortly after the 9/11 attacks. 
First, Congress authorized the President to use “all 
necessary and appropriate force” against those who planned, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.87  Invoking this 
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF) and his 
independent Article II powers, Bush deployed troops to 
Afghanistan (whose government had backed al Qaeda) and 
beefed up antiterrorism efforts both at home and abroad.88  
Among other things, Bush claimed the power to indefinitely 
detain “enemy combatants” (a status determined by the executive 
branch) and, at his discretion, to try them by military 
commissions appointed by the Secretary of Defense.89 
Second, the “Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism” (USA PATRIOT) Act increased surveillance of 
suspected terrorists, especially by reducing restrictions on 
domestic gathering of foreign intelligence; facilitated the 
deportation of immigrants suspected of involvement with 
terrorism; authorized law enforcement officials to search homes 
and businesses without prior notice to the owners (“sneak and 
 
upon the legal opinions of Bush Administration attorneys in the White House and in the 
Departments of Justice and Defense.  Id.  Hence, the investigation likely will expand in 
scope, as has occurred with independent counsel inquiries in the past.  Id. 
Such investigations strike me as misguided.  Most obviously, they compromise national 
security by creating a fear of legal liability that might discourage government officials 
from taking decisive steps that they otherwise would deem necessary to protect America.  
A related concern is that such possible liability might deter well-qualified candidates from 
agreeing to serve in the executive branch in the first place.  Finally, such investigations 
and prosecutions necessarily carry with them a political taint, especially when a different 
party assumes control of the White House.  For instance, George W. Bush would have 
erred gravely if he had prosecuted members of the Clinton Administration for alleged war 
crimes, such as unilaterally bombing Kosovo.  Similarly, Clinton wisely did not pursue 
charges against the first President Bush for his conduct of the Gulf War. 
Examples could be multiplied, but the point is clear: Politicized criminal proceedings 
against an ex-President for wartime decisions generally are a bad idea.  The only 
exception would be if a President had committed genocide or a crime of similar magnitude 
which could have no valid justification as a war measure. 
 87 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 88 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1058. 
 89 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 
U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 2008). 
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peek”); permitted government searches of telephone, internet, 
financial, and other records; and enhanced the Treasury 
Secretary’s power to regulate and monitor financial transactions 
involving suspected terrorists and their allies.90  The USA 
PATRIOT Act’s foes have argued that it violates constitutional 
rights and liberties in many ways, most notably by allowing 
either the indefinite detention or arbitrary deportation of 
immigrants and by authorizing federal law enforcement officials 
to search private homes, business, and records without the 
affected party’s knowledge.91 
The AUMF and the USA PATRIOT Act have generated 
multiple lawsuits, although to date the Supreme Court has 
adjudicated only actions taken under the former statute.92  
Before discussing those cases, I want to highlight three aspects of 
the War on Terrorism that suggest President Bush actually 
showed more restraint than his predecessors.93 
First, unlike Lincoln and Wilson, Bush did not censor speech 
or the press or criminally prosecute his critics, despite their 
vehement and often vicious verbal attacks on him and his 
antiterrorism policies.94  Admittedly, the USA PATRIOT Act has 
raised legitimate First Amendment concerns,95 but they are of a 
far smaller magnitude than those that resulted from previous 
Presidents’ flagrant suppression of valid opposition to their 
wartime actions. 
Second, in contrast to FDR’s treatment of Japanese 
Americans, President Bush worked with Congress to specifically 
prohibit and condemn discrimination against Arab and Muslim 
Americans and to ensure review of all allegations of civil rights 
abuses.96  Such sensitivity was welcome in the emotionally 
charged aftermath of the September 11 attacks. 
 
 90 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (codified in 
scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 42, 47, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 91 Entering the debate over the USA PATRIOT Act would take me far afield, and so I 
have merely provided a bare summary. 
 92 See infra Part I.D.2. 
 93 Other scholars have noted this comparative restraint.  See, e.g., Goldsmith & 
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 288; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 623. 
 94 See Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1006 n.8 (citing such criticisms).  
In a typical example of intemperate rhetoric, a well-known national columnist declared 
that Bush was “[r]emarkably brazen,” had “trampled civil liberties,” had perpetrated 
“Republican outrages,” and had gone to “ludicrous lengths to avoid being challenged.”  See 
Maureen Dowd, W’s Stiletto Diplomacy, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, Section 4, 
Column 6. 
 95 For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see STONE, supra note 5, at 539–42, 552–
54. 
 96 See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 90, at Titles I & X. 
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Third, Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus 
unilaterally and broadly, whereas Bush and Congress left it 
intact.  The only exception was for a few hundred foreign 
suspected terrorists imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who were given extensive 
administrative and judicial review as a substitute.97 
Of course, President Bush made many mistakes.  Even 
though he won the 2000 election by a razor-thin margin and with 
help from a controversial Supreme Court decision,98 Bush 
governed as if he had a mandate.  He came into office with no 
national experience and little knowledge about military affairs, 
foreign policy, or constitutional law.  After 9/11, Bush asserted 
 
 97 Initially, such detainees would not be designated “enemy combatants” until they 
had received “multiple levels of review by military officers and officials of the Department 
of Defense.”  See Memorandum of the Secretary of Navy, Implementation of Combat 
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (July 29, 2004) at enclosure (1).  Next, a CSRT would decide 
whether a Guantanamo prisoner had been held unlawfully and, if so, order his release.  
Id.  Conversely, if the CSRT affirmed the Defense Department’s determination, the 
detainee could be tried by a military commission according to the usual procedural rules 
of military courts, except that the commission could (1) exclude him from any part of the 
proceeding to protect “national security interests,” (2) admit any evidence that had 
probative value to a reasonable person (including hearsay), and (3) deny the defendant’s 
access to classified information if doing so would not deprive him of a fair trial.  See 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–595, 614 (2006) (summarizing these procedures). 
The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) incorporated these executive regulations and added a 
requirement that the Secretary of Defense set forth procedures for periodic consideration 
of “any new evidence” relating to “enemy combatant” status and for an annual review to 
determine the need to continue to hold foreign inmates.  See DTA, div. A, tit. X, Pub. L. 
No. 109-148, §§ 1005–06, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740–44 (Dec. 30, 2005).  Furthermore, the DTA 
granted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit “exclusive jurisdiction” to examine 
whether the Defense Department’s standards and procedures were properly applied by 
the CSRT and were consistent with the federal Constitution and laws.  See id. at 
§ 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2744.  That court was given similar jurisdiction to review 
military commission decisions.  See id. at § 1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. at 2744.  Such review 
would have been inexplicable unless Congress had approved of such commissions. 
Because the DTA empowered a federal court to adjudicate claims by Guantanamo 
prisoners that they were being detained illegally (the basic function of habeas), Congress 
determined that regular habeas jurisdiction for them was unnecessary.  Accordingly, the 
DTA provided that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at 
Guantanamo Bay.”  See id. at § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742.  Five Justices then reached 
the counterintuitive conclusion that Congress had neither removed the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction nor authorized military commissions.  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566–95.  This 
holding forced Congress to enact the Military Commissions Act (MCA) to make plain that 
Hamdan was wrong on both counts.  See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 
2006). 
 98 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103–11 (2000) (per curiam) (reversing a Florida 
Supreme Court decision interpreting its state’s laws as permitting election officials to use 
different criteria to determine voter intent in recounting contested presidential election 
ballots as violating the Equal Protection’s prohibition on treating voters arbitrarily); see 
also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative 
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359 (2001) (criticizing the five conservative Republican 
Justices in the majority for creatively interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to 
facilitate the election of Bush, the Republican candidate). 
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sweeping unilateral war powers under Article II, thereby 
unnecessarily antagonizing a Congress that had given him all 
the authority he could possibly need in fighting terrorism.99  
Despite the potential for inter-branch conflict, Bush’s handling of 
this crisis earned him extraordinary popular support.100 
His downfall began with the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
which rested on several assumptions: that Iraq had supported al 
Qaeda, that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, that 
victory would be easy, and that a thriving democracy would 
sprout up.101  When these suppositions proved to be false, Bush’s 
popularity began to decline, but then increased just enough in 
the fall of 2004 to ensure his reelection.102  Yet the Iraq war 
dragged on and imposed huge costs, which exacerbated the 
economic devastation wrought by the September 11 attacks.103  A 
weakened economy encouraged the government to dramatically 
decrease interest rates and to tolerate lax lending (especially for 
housing), which ultimately led to a financial meltdown.104 
As these troubles piled up, Bush’s popularity hit historic 
lows.105  Nonetheless, he continued to assert aggressive executive 
powers as if the United States were in a continuing military 
emergency akin to the Civil War or World War II, even though 
the carnage and destruction were clearly not equivalent.  
Moreover, Bush never demanded the national mobilization and 
 
 99 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 100 After September 11, 2001, his approval rating shot to 90%, and it remained in the 60–80% 
range for the next year-and-a-half.  See George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116500/Presidential-Approval-Ratings-George-Bush.aspx (last visited July 
31, 2009); see also Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some 
Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1469 (2007) (observing that Bush 
benefitted from the “rally around the flag” effect until 2003). 
 101 A good analysis of the legal, political, and factual errors that led to the Iraq War is 
contained in Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 
IND. L.J. 1199 (2006).  Initially, Bush Administration neo-conservatives pushed the 
President to invade Iraq with the unrealistic goal of transforming it into a liberal 
democracy, and they mistakenly predicted that America would be welcomed as liberators.  
Id. at 1230–33, 1247–50.  The United States then went to war based upon unproven 
claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that he had 
links to al Qaeda–allegations which neither Congress nor the media investigated 
independently and rigorously.  Id. at 1212–16, 1228–30, 1246, 1250–53.  Finally, the Bush 
Administration incompetently planned and executed the war.  Id. at 1250-51. 
 102 After hitting a 2004 ratings low of 46% in May, Bush increased his support to over 
50% in October and November and won a close reelection.  See George W. Bush 
Presidential Job Approval, supra note 100. 
 103 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR 
WAR: THE TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT (2008). 
 104 See Robert Hockett, Bringing It All Back Home: How To Save Main Street, Ignore 
K Street, and Thereby Save Wall Street, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427 (2009). 
 105 His second-term average approval rating was 37%, with a historic nadir of 25% in 
October 2008.  See George W. Bush Presidential Job Approval, supra note 100. 
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shared sacrifice that characterized such all-out wars.106  Another 
intractable political problem inhered in the peculiar nature of the 
War on Terrorism, which measured success primarily in negative 
terms—thwarting attacks, the details of which could not be 
publicized for national security reasons—rather than positive 
battlefield victories, such as Gettysburg and D-Day.107  
Symbolically, then, it was far easier for Bush to rally the public 
in the wake of the tangible 9/11 atrocities than in the vague 
domain of undisclosed possible assaults that did not occur. 
My preliminary assessment, then, is that Bush consistently 
took strong actions to fight terrorism; that Americans (and their 
representatives in Congress) always supported these efforts; but 
that the Iraq War and the economic downturn fatally weakened 
his Presidency.  Bush did not, however, adopt many of the 
liberty-infringing policies of his predecessors, such as censoring 
the press or imprisoning members of a particular ethnic group.108 
In one area, though, Bush did follow the lead of every 
President dating back to Washington: using military 
commissions to try enemy combatants charged with war 
crimes.109  Historically, the Court had rebuffed those few military 
prisoners who challenged the constitutionality of military 
tribunals, as in Vallandigham110 and Quirin.111  Recently, 
however, a majority of Justices have become far more receptive to 
such claims and others relating to habeas corpus. 
2.  The “Enemy Combatant” Decisions 
This new approach began with two 2004 cases.  First, in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,112 the Court held that “enemy combatants” 
who were American citizens could not be detained indefinitely, 
but rather had due process rights to notice and a hearing before 
an impartial decision-maker (which might include a military 
 
 106 See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 280–81. 
 107 See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb–Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 689, 713-15 (2008). 
 108 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.  For an opposing view, see David 
Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2003). 
 109 Military tribunals had been used without legislative authorization or judicial 
review since the American Revolution.  See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 83, 89–90. 
 110 Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863), discussed supra notes 57–60 
and accompanying text. 
 111 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), discussed supra notes 74–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 112 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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commission).113  Second, Rasul v. Bush114 involved Bush’s order 
detaining non-citizen “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo, 
which he had made in light of longstanding Supreme Court case 
law interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute as not 
applicable to foreigners seized and imprisoned outside of the 
United States.115  A majority of Justices weakly distinguished 
this precedent and ruled that this statute permitted these 
Guantanamo detainees to file habeas petitions.116 
Congress quickly made clear that, contrary to Rasul, its 
habeas statute did not give any federal court (including the 
Supreme Court) jurisdiction over aliens at Guantanamo.117  
Instead, Congress worked with the executive branch to craft for 
these prisoners an elaborate set of procedures, which included 
several levels of military justice followed by review in the District 
of Columbia Circuit and Supreme Court.118  In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,119 five Justices reached the startling conclusion that 
Congress had not stripped the Court of appellate jurisdiction over 
the foreign Guantanamo inmates or authorized their trial by 
military commissions (even though the AUMF plainly 
contemplated such tribunals).120  Again, Congress had to clarify 
that it meant what it said: No federal court had jurisdiction to 
entertain habeas petitions from these detainees, and the 
President could try them by military commissions.121 
In response, the same five Justices in Boumediene v. Bush122 
disregarded centuries of practice and precedent in holding that 
the Constitution’s writ of habeas corpus extends to alien “enemy 
combatants” who have been captured and detained outside of the 
 
 113 See id. at 516–34; see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 1048–52 
(analyzing Hamdi in detail). 
 114 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 115 See id. at 488–506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (setting forth this traditional 
understanding of the habeas statute). 
 116 See id. at 470–85 (majority opinion); see also Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra 
note 1, at 1052–53 (examining Rasul). 
 117 See DTA, supra note 97, at 2739–44 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C., 
including titles 10, 28, and 42). 
 118 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 119 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 120 Id. at 570–606.  For a thorough critique of Hamdan, see Pushaw, Enemy 
Combatant, supra note 1, at 1058–78.  For a sophisticated defense of Hamdan, Rasul, and 
Hamdi, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, 
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007) (contending 
that the Court properly applied a “common law” model of habeas by interpreting 
constitutional and statutory provisions on a case-specific basis in light of practical 
concerns, evolving legal norms, and awareness of the comparative institutional 
competence of Congress, the President, and the judiciary). 
 121 See Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2008). 
 122 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
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United States’ sovereign territory.123  Accordingly, the Court 
invalidated Congress’s alternative procedures for such detainees 
as an effective suspension of the constitutional habeas writ and 
as insufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause.124 
Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene depart from the 
Court’s usual approach of deferring to the President’s exercise of 
war powers.  Instead, they fall within a minority of cases in 
which the Court has checked a politically weak and unpopular 
President who persisted in exercising war powers aggressively 
and in disregard of individual constitutional rights, even though 
such tough medicine struck the Justices as unnecessary because 
the military emergency had passed. 
3.  Milligan and Youngstown 
The classic example is Ex parte Milligan,125 which came 
down a year after the Civil War had ended.  The Court granted 
the habeas petition of an Indiana citizen who had been given the 
death penalty by a military tribunal, which violated his 
constitutional right to an ordinary jury trial because he had 
never served in the army and the Indiana courts had always 
remained open.126  The Court conceded that both this holding and 
its assertion that “[t]he Constitution . . . [applies] equally in war 
and in peace” could not be squared with its decisions during the 
Civil War.  The Court apologized for succumbing to the 
passionate “feelings and interests” caused by the grave threat to 
“public safety,” but vowed in the future to render wholly “legal 
judgment.”127 
The Justices knew, but did not say, that they could 
successfully thwart Andrew Johnson because of his precarious 
political situation.  The Republican Lincoln had selected the 
Democrat Johnson, the only Southern Senator who remained 
loyal to the United States, as Vice President primarily as an olive 
branch to the South.128  After Lincoln’s assassination, the 
politically inept and stubborn Johnson engaged in an 
acrimonious fight over Reconstruction with the Radical 
Republicans who controlled Congress, and they eventually 
 
 123 Id. at 2244–77.  For a lengthy explanation of the implausibility of the Court’s 
historical analysis of habeas, see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for 
Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1975, 2020–46 (2009). 
 124 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2262–75. 
 125 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 126 Id. at 107–08, 118–27. 
 127 Id. at 109. 
 128 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 220; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND 
TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 2–6 (1973). 
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impeached him.129  The last thing Johnson needed was a clash 
with the Court, which saw little point in allowing a President 
who did not enjoy congressional support to continue to abridge 
constitutional liberties. 
Unfortunately, the Court quickly broke its promise in 
Milligan to uphold the Constitution “at all times, and under all 
circumstances”130 by repeatedly caving in to many Acts of 
Congress during Reconstruction that appeared to violate the 
Constitution.131  The Justices apparently recognized that they 
could not risk defying the mighty Congress, just as they had 
backed down from confrontations with Lincoln.  Indeed, the 
Court resumed its posture of deference until after World War II, 
when the ghost of Milligan reappeared. 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,132 six Justices 
rejected President Truman’s assertion of independent Article II 
power to seize and run American steel mills, which faced a labor 
shutdown, in order to secure steel for the Korean War effort.133  
In the majority’s view, Truman had failed to show that military 
necessity justified his decision to take private property 
domestically without due process, especially since Congress had 
not explicitly authorized this action.134  In his famous 
concurrence, Justice Jackson argued that Truman had 
disregarded Congress’s will, that in such circumstances the 
President bore the heavy burden of demonstrating that the 
Constitution gave him alone the power to act, and that Truman 
had not met this difficult test.135  Conversely, Jackson presumed 
the constitutional validity of congressionally authorized 
Presidential actions, absent an extremely unlikely scenario in 
which the federal government as a whole lacked power.136  As 
 
 129 See BENEDICT, supra note 128, at 6–125. 
 130 See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120–21. 
 131 See, e.g., Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 497–501 (1866) (declining 
to pass on the constitutionality of federal legislation establishing martial law in the 
former Confederate states); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 50–51, 76–77 (1867) 
(refusing to hear a complaint that Congress had unconstitutionally abolished a state 
government); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508–09, 512–15 (1869) (holding 
that Congress could repeal the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over a pending case, which 
had already been briefed and argued, brought by a newspaperman who had been 
imprisoned for exercising his First Amendment right to criticize Mississippi’s military 
government and who had challenged the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts). 
 132 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 133 Id. at 582–89. 
 134 See id. at 585–88. 
 135 Id. at 637–38, 640–55.  The full Court expressly embraced Justice Jackson’s 
analytical framework in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981). 
 136 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Finally, Jackson 
suggested that if Congress had neither authorized nor prohibited the President’s action, 
the matter would be resolved politically rather than judicially.  See id. at 637. 
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Chief Justice Vinson and two other dissenters stressed, however, 
many federal statutes and Article II allowed the President to do 
whatever he considered necessary to win wars (including seizing 
property), and the Court had often sustained such executive 
actions.137 
Because the dissent correctly applied the relevant law, the 
conclusion seems inescapable that practical factors drove the 
majority’s decision.  By 1952, Americans were war-weary, 
Truman’s popularity had hit historic lows, and he did not have 
the political capital or incentives to challenge the Court.138  
Moreover, the majority apparently believed that the President’s 
interference with Fifth Amendment rights could not be excused 
by his claimed need to vigorously prosecute the Korean War, 
which did not pose the same life-or-death threat to the United 
States as World War II or the Civil War. 
Libertarians who hail Youngstown do not appreciate that the 
case was about politics, not law.  The same holds true for the 
Court’s recent decisions involving “enemy combatants.” 
4.  The Guantanamo Detainee Cases in Historical 
Perspective 
Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene bear an uncanny 
resemblance to Milligan and Youngstown.  Once again, a 
majority of pragmatic Justices capitalized on a rare opportunity 
to uphold individual constitutional rights against an unpopular 
and politically compromised President, George Bush, who 
continued to boldly assert war powers long after the crisis of 9/11 
had passed.139 
I seriously doubt that the Court would have rendered the 
same rulings in late 2001 or 2002, when Americans supported 
President Bush by huge margins.140  Moreover, the Justices 
would surely have deferred to him if the War on Terrorism had 
metastasized into an epic conflict on the scale of the Civil War or 
the two World Wars, with attendant national mobilization and 
 
 137 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668–710 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing sources). 
 138 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Price of Experience: The Constitution After September 
11, 2001, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 42 (2002) (describing Youngstown as “the backlash to 
the legally clumsy attempt, by a famously unpopular President, to invoke national 
security as the justification for seizing steel mills during a labor dispute in 1952, an 
election year in which control of the White House subsequently shifted from one party to 
the other”). 
 139 For development of this thesis, see Pushaw, Enemy Combatant, supra note 1, at 
1005–16, 1047–83; see also Tushnet, supra note 100, at 1468–69 (arguing that the Court 
asserted a strong role because of unique and contingent political circumstances, not 
because of any permanent features of constitutional law and structure). 
 140 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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massive sacrifices.  Finally, I predict that when the next Fort 
Sumter, Pearl Harbor, or September 11 occurs, the President will 
take whatever military response he deems necessary, and the 
Court will yield to him. 
5.  Justifying the War on Terrorism 
Quite apart from the issue of judicial review is the rationale 
for the President’s actions in the first place.  Historically, 
triumph in war supplied its own justification for any suppression 
of constitutional rights and liberties.  In this tradition, President 
Bush can defend his policies on the simple ground that they 
helped him accomplish his overarching goal of preventing further 
terrorist attacks.141 
Again, it is possible that America might have avoided this 
result even if Bush had adopted a different approach that was 
less intrusive on constitutional liberties.  Like his predecessors, 
however, Bush erred on the side of caution in protecting America.  
However harsh the current verdict on Bush is, imagine what it 
would be like if he had not acted forcefully enough and America 
had suffered further terrorist outrages. 
To return to my larger thesis, I am skeptical of post hoc 
arguments that particular wartime infringements of civil 
liberties were unnecessary to achieve military victory.  I do not 
deny that, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that certain 
Presidential actions went beyond the pale.  Obvious examples 
include Wilson’s targeting of political and journalistic dissenters 
and Roosevelt’s mass internment of Japanese Americans.142  It is 
gratifying to see that President Bush avoided similar mistakes in 
waging the War on Terrorism, although he undoubtedly made 
other errors.143 
Nevertheless, we should always keep in mind that 
Presidents in the midst of a shooting war do not have the luxury 
of hindsight.  History teaches that it is naive to suppose that 
either Congress or the Court can stop a popular President during 
a military crisis from curbing individual rights and liberties as 
he deems essential for national security. 
 
 141 Charles Allen, War on Terrorism: Bush Highlights Success of Military, Intelligence 
Community in Preventing Terrorist Attacks, FOREIGN POL’Y BULL. 58, 60 (2009). 
 142 STONE, supra note 5, at 12, 135–233, 284–307. 
 143 See supra notes 93–109 and accompanying text. 
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II.  WARTIME RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES AS CATALYSTS 
FOR IMPROVING CIVIL RIGHTS 
Many scholars have detected a historical pattern in which 
fearful Americans unquestioningly back Presidents during 
wartime when they invade civil liberties, later regret their 
complicity in such wrongdoing, resolve to avoid such unjust 
overreactions in the future, and try to compensate by granting 
civil rights generously.144  The classic example offered to support 
this “remorse theory” is that Lincoln’s excesses supposedly begat 
civil rights legislation and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments.145  Another proffered illustration is that 
World War II ultimately helped spark the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Collective guilt over wartime limits on individual liberties 
may be one factor that has contributed to advancements in civil 
rights laws, but it is usually simplistic to posit a direct causal 
relation.146  Rather, such laws represent the culmination of a 
complex process that involves historical reflection, religious and 
 
 144 ALAN BRINKLEY, A Familiar Story: Lessons From Past Assaults on Freedoms, in 
THE WARS ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 32–44 (Richard 
C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003); but cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 622–
25 (rejecting this theory). 
 145 For a perceptive analysis of the complex relationship between Lincoln’s actions 
during the Civil War and the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, see AMAR, 
supra note 25, at 351–401. 
 146 There is at least one notable exception where a straight line can be drawn.  
During World War I and its aftermath, the Court held that the government’s interest in 
winning overrode the First Amendment rights of Americans who had criticized the war in 
violation of federal statutes prohibiting both “sedition” (defined as disloyal or abusive 
speech or writings about federal or military officials) and “espionage” (which included not 
merely spying but also obstructing military recruitment and attempting to foment 
disloyalty, insubordination, or refusal of duty).  See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (citing statutes).  Most notoriously, the Court sustained the 
conviction of labor leader Eugene Debs, Wilson’s political foe who had received over a 
million votes as Socialist Party candidate for President, for criticizing America’s 
intervention in the war and urging workers not to join the armed forces.  See Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919). 
Such federal government abuses later led the Court to reevaluate, and ultimately reject, 
its historical practice of declining to review the constitutionality of such legislation.  See 
MAY, supra note 69, at 1–2, 13–16, 191–253.  Instead, Justices Holmes and Brandeis 
developed a test whereby the government could not prohibit expression advocating illegal 
conduct unless there was a “clear and present danger”—i.e., a reasonable basis for fearing 
that serious harm would result imminently.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 
627–28 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J. 
concurring).  The full Court adopted this approach in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
447–448 (1969).  A few years later, a majority of Justices upheld the First Amendment 
right of a newspaper to publish classified government documents about the Vietnam War 
because President Nixon had merely asserted, rather than demonstrated, that their 
publication would cause grave damage to national security.  See New York Times v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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moral considerations, changing social and ideological norms, 
economic realities, and visionary leaders. 
An obvious flaw of the “remorse theory” is that sometimes 
civil rights and liberties are actually enhanced during wartime.  
Indeed, perhaps the greatest grant of freedom and equality at the 
stroke of a pen, the Emancipation Proclamation, occurred smack 
in the middle of the supposedly liberty-destroying Civil War.147 
Furthermore, history refutes the notion that America has 
progressed in a linear fashion toward ever-expanding respect for 
civil liberties in each succeeding war and enhanced civil rights 
after each military conflict.148  For instance, Lincoln’s alleged 
excesses in curtailing freedom, and civil rights laws enacted in 
the late 1860s, did absolutely nothing to prevent later Presidents 
like Wilson and Roosevelt from infringing individual rights and 
liberties in the course of waging war.  Concededly, President 
Bush avoided some of the more egregious mistakes of the past, 
such as targeting people for mistreatment solely because they 
happened to be members of the same minority group as those of a 
nation America was fighting.149  Nonetheless, perhaps this self-
control reflected the fact that the War on Terror was small 
potatoes compared to struggles like World War II.150  If 9/11 had 
been followed by major attacks on Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, and Houston, history does not fill me with 
confidence that the executive branch’s response would have been 
as restrained. 
Finally, it is almost impossible to prove a one-to-one 
correspondence between regret over wartime suppression of 
fundamental liberties and subsequent civil rights laws.  For 
example, remorse over Lincoln’s interference with individual 
freedoms did not have much to do with the Reconstruction 
Amendments and statutes.  Most importantly, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantees of Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
Privileges or Immunities were not aimed at preventing the 
federal government in later wars from taking the same sorts of 
draconian actions as Lincoln.  On the contrary, these 
Amendments completed the process Lincoln had started in the 
Emancipation Proclamation–perhaps grossly beyond the bounds 
of his Article II powers–by guaranteeing the newly freed slaves 
(and everyone else) their basic civil rights.151 
 
 147 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text; see also AMAR, supra note 25, at 
356–57. 
 148 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 622–25. 
 149 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 150 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 623. 
 151 See supra notes 37–67 and accompanying text. 
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Turning to World War II, Americans eventually felt great 
national shame over the mistreatment of Japanese Americans.152  
However, that remorse was not the main impetus behind, or 
primary focus of, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 
1960s, which concerned the plight of African (not Asian) 
Americans. 
Certain events related to World War II did help give rise to 
this crusade, but the internment of Japanese citizens ranks far 
down on the list.  The most compelling argument was that 
blacks, having valiantly fought for America overseas and 
sacrificed for the domestic war effort, deserved as a matter of 
justice to be treated with dignity rather than face continuing 
legal discrimination.153  A related point is that massive wartime 
production had induced African Americans in the South to 
migrate in huge numbers to take jobs in Northern and 
Midwestern industrial cities, which increased both their 
economic clout and voting power.154  Similarly, black employment 
grew in the federal government, which also took steps such as 
barring racial discrimination in war contracts and, eventually, in 
the armed forces.155  Ideologically, the United States’ 
condemnation of Nazism and other regimes touting ethnic 
superiority forced Americans to confront their own racism.156  
The need for racial change became imperative during the Cold 
War because segregation contradicted America’s professed ideals 
of democracy, freedom, and justice, thereby harming its foreign 
relations—especially its efforts to garner support in nations that 
had formed after the breakup of colonial empires.157 
Civil rights laws also reflected many factors that had little 
direct connection to the war.  One is the fortuitous emergence of 
leaders of various sorts: legal and judicial (such as Thurgood 
Marshall and Earl Warren);158 religious and moral (most notably 
Martin Luther King);159 and political (the Southern President 
 
 152 This remorse culminated in the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which 
apologized to Japanese Americans who had been interned and granted them reparations.  
50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000). 
 153 See AMAR, supra note 25, at 440–41; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 174, 181–
82, 445 (2004). 
 154 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 173–74, 178–81, 188–89, 288, 290–91, 444–45; 
PAUL BREST ET AL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 893 (5th ed. 2006). 
 155 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 178–79, 186 (citing sources). 
 156 Id. at 172–77, 185, 187–88, 291, 304, 444–45. 
 157 The definitive study is MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE IN THE 
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 250–52 (Princeton Univ. Press 2000).  See also 
KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 182–86, 288, 291, 444–46. 
 158 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 193–343, 450–51. 
 159 Id. at 378–80. 
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Lyndon Johnson supporting the Civil Rights Act).160  The 
galvanizing event was the Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education161 that racial discrimination by states in 
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.162  The often 
violent backlash to the desegregation cases in the South helped 
to turn public opinion in favor of greater protection for blacks, as 
social mores shifted.163  Religious faith and values, as embodied 
by King, also induced many people to fight racism.164 
In sum, wartime restrictions on basic liberties might be one 
element that influences subsequent positive developments in civil 
rights.  However, such limits cannot be isolated as the sole, or 
even primary, consideration. 
It is too early to tell whether President Bush’s infringements 
of individual liberties in fighting the War on Terrorism will 
eventually improve civil rights.  However, any cause/effect 
relationship would be highly unlikely.  For one thing, ordinary 
Americans do not appear to have a collective sense of guilt about 
the Bush Administration’s actions taken pursuant to the AUMF 
and USA PATRIOT Act,165 and the Democrats who gained control 
of the White House and Congress in the 2008 elections have not 
repealed or significantly amended those laws.  Indeed, even today 
only a minority of Americans support closing the Guantanamo 
prison,166 which Barack Obama has yet to shut down167 even 
though the intellectual elite have cited it as the crowning symbol 
of Bush’s tyranny.168  Any future expansion of civil rights will 
reflect the election of Barack Obama and a more liberal stance on 
this issue, not regret over antiterrorism policies. 
 
 160 See id. at 436. 
 161 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 162 See id. at 489–96. 
 163 See KLARMAN, supra note 155, at 442.  For an exhaustive and insightful analysis 
of Brown and its impact, see id. at 290–442. 
 164 Id. at 377–78. 
 165 See Lydia Saad, Americans Generally Comfortable with Patriot Act, GALLUP, Mar. 
8, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/10858/Americans-Generally-Comfortable-Patriot-
Act.aspx. 
 166 See Lymari Morales, Americans Send No Clear Mandate on Guantanamo Bay, 
GALLUP, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/113893/Americans-Send-No-Clear-
Mandate-Guantanamo-Bay.aspx (documenting that only 35% of Americans favor closing 
Guantanamo, about the same percentage as in 2007). 
 167 See Peter Baker, The Words Have Changed, But Have the Policies?, NEW YORK 
TIMES, April 3, 2009 (noting that President Obama has left Guantanamo open and has 
continued most of Bush’s military policies). 
 168 For example, David Cole, the most prolific critic of the Bush Administration’s 
policies, conceded that cases like Rasul had little legal basis but rather embodied the 
majority’s concern that Guantanamo had become an “international embarrassment.”  See 
David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants’ Rights, 37 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 651–53 (2006). 
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A final difficulty with the “remorse theory” is that many 
distinguished judges and scholars have posited the opposite 
hypothesis: that when the President asserts increased powers 
during an emergency, they tend to become permanent and 
diminish individual rights and freedoms, especially when the 
Court approves them.169  A well-known articulation of this 
position can be found in Justice Jackson’s dissent from the 
Court’s decision to uphold the federal government’s internment of 
Japanese Americans:  
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain 
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of 
the order itself.  A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt 
to last longer than the military emergency. . . . But once a judicial 
opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the 
Constitution sanctions such an order, this Court for all time has 
validated [a] principle . . . [which] then lies about like a loaded weapon 
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.  Every repetition imbeds that principle more 
deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes. . . . A 
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and 
it is an incident.  But if we review and approve, that passing incident 
becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.  There it has a generative 
power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image.170 
Logically, the “collective remorse” and “loaded weapon” 
theories cannot both be correct.  Rather, history demonstrates 
that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.  Every armed 
conflict is unique and requires a distinctive approach in 
balancing liberty against security.171  Similarly, when a war 
ends, civil rights progress at a rate that depends on a huge 
number of legal, political, ideological, social, economic, and moral 
variables.  More simplistic explanations fail to capture the 
messiness of the historical evidence. 
III.  JUSTIFYING EMERGENCY INFRINGEMENTS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 
BASED ON LATER CIVIL RIGHTS GAINS 
Assuming that wartime curtailments of individual freedoms 
resulted in later enlargement of civil rights, was the tradeoff 
worth it?  It is impossible to answer this question objectively.  
Those who actually suffered deprivation of their liberties would 
surely answer no.  For instance, Americans of Japanese descent 
 
 169 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 609–21, 626–42 (citing the many 
thinkers who have espoused this thesis but demonstrating its conceptual, institutional, 
psychological, normative, and empirical weaknesses). 
 170 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245–46 (1944). 
 171 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 610, 625–26. 
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who lost their property and freedom during the Second World 
War would not feel vindicated even if they (or their children) 
received civil rights protections decades later.  Conversely, the 
primary beneficiaries of such laws after both World War II and 
the Civil War, African Americans, would likely have a completely 
different perspective, especially because their liberty, equality, 
and dignity had been systematically denied in times of both war 
and peace. 
In short, determining whether permanent civil rights gains 
compensated for temporary restrictions during military 
emergencies requires an utterly subjective judgment.  Instead, it 
seems more useful to keep a sharp focus on the main issue–
whether the wartime limits were necessary to achieve the greater 
good of winning the war.  If so, then the government’s actions 
were justified, regardless of its later treatment of civil rights.  
Indeed, subsequent military emergencies might dictate similar 
draconian measures, regardless of what laws are on the books. 
On the other hand, if a particular invasion of civil liberties 
was not essential to win a war, and a President knew or should 
have known this fact, the government can never make up for that 
pointless sacrifice.  For example, to the extent that Wilson 
censored expression to spite his political enemies or Roosevelt 
imprisoned Japanese Americans because of raw racial prejudice, 
those sins cannot be expiated by the later passage of civil rights 
laws.  Furthermore, a President can never rely upon the 
possibility of such legislation as a justification for gratuitously 
violating individual rights and liberties. 
CONCLUSION 
War is hell.  Winning one requires many hard decisions 
based on constantly changing military circumstances and 
incomplete information.  Presidents in the midst of a national 
security crisis often conclude that they have to do unspeakably 
awful things, as when Lincoln ordered that Union Army 
deserters be shot172 and Truman chose to drop atomic bombs.173 
Keeping in mind the emergency conditions that actually 
existed and the facts the President had available, it is usually 
difficult to conclude with certitude that his specific infringement 
of civil liberties was unnecessary for military success.  It is 
equally speculative to assert that regret over wartime excesses 
 
 172 JAMES R. ARNOLD & ROBERTA WEINER, LOST CAUSE: THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR, 
1864-1865, at 8 (2002). 
 173 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 391–96, 400–01, 428, 436–44, 448, 453–60, 463 
(1992). 
Do Not Delete 10/15/2009 6:33 PM 
2009] Justifying Wartime Limits on Civil Rights and Liberties 703 
has directly resulted in enhanced protection of civil rights.  
Similarly, no one can objectively determine whether such a 
tradeoff (if one existed) was worth it. 
As with all armed conflicts, reasonable people can disagree 
about the optimum balance between individual rights and 
collective security in the War on Terrorism.  In evaluating the 
response of the Bush and Obama Administrations to this threat, 
it is important to recognize the validity of a range of possible 
responses and to compare Presidents to their real-life 
predecessors, not to some idealized leader. 
